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Praying for America:
The Anti-Theocracy and Equal Status Principles of
the Free Exercise, Equal Protection and
Establishment Clauses
Corey Brettschneider*
In this essay I argue that the Constitution’s Equal
Protection, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clauses share
common principled limits on the role that religion can play in
public life. Specifically, drawing on the free-exercise case of
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, the equal protection case of Romer v. Evans, and the
establishment clause case of Town of Greece v. Galloway, I
propose two principles to describe the proper place of religious
justification as a basis for law. The first requirement is that in
addition to any religious reasons for laws, the state must have
secular reasons available that can appeal to non-religious
citizens. I call this the “anti-theocracy principle.” The second,
“equal status principle” states that even religious justifications
that have secular equivalents must respect the equal status of
persons in a democracy regardless of their race, gender or
LGBTQ identity. In addition to the limits the anti-theocracy
and equal status principles place on legitimate law making, I
also argue they also limit state expression. Throughout the
piece I draw from the ideal of “public reason” found in the
political theory of John Locke and John Rawls. In addition to
clarifying the Constitution’s understanding of the role of
religion in justifying law and in government sponsored
expression, my aim is also to demonstrate how an
understanding of public reason can be operationalized in
* Professor of Political Science, Brown University. I would like to thank Nelson
Tebbe, Cécile Laborde, Micah Schwartzman, Joshua Matz, Aidan Calvelli, Geoffrey Stone,
Aziz Huq, and Minh Ly for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I presented a draft of
this paper at the excellent conference Religion and Liberal Political Philosophy at University
College London and received excellent comments there as well.
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constitutional cases across the Free Exercise, Equal Protection,
and Establishment Clauses. I, therefore, demonstrate a
common role for public reason across three fundamental parts
of the Constitution often thought distinct.
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INTRODUCTION
What role do religious justifications play in legitimate law
making and government policy? The Free Exercise, Establishment,
and Equal Protection Clauses each have a distinct text and history
that bear on the question. In this essay, however, I argue that these
three clauses have in common a commitment to two fundamental
normative principles that underlie them and that clarify the
legitimate place of religious justification for law and government
expression. These principles are helpfully explicated by two
principles of public reason that explain the proper limits on the
kinds of justification for law in a liberal democracy.
The first principle bans theocratic justifications for law and
government action. Legislation and government action are
theocratic when they fail to satisfy a requirement of “secular
independence,” namely that the state must have available secular
1128
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reasons for laws in addition to any religious reasons. Although
religious reasons might legitimately be given for laws, these
reasons must also be explainable on non-religious terms. For
example, President Lyndon Johnson gave religious justifications,
drawn from the Civil Rights Movement, for the 1965 Voting Rights
Act.1 In his historic “We Shall Overcome” speech, he argued
that racial equality is “right in the eyes of man and of God.”2 This
was a religious form of state speech, but it was not theocratic. It
satisfied the secular independence requirement because the reasons
for the Voting Rights Act could also be explained on secular terms
to non-religious citizens. In his speech, President Johnson invoked
the secular principle that government should be by consent of the
governed. He supported the Voting Rights Act by appealing to the
Constitutional requirement that “no person shall be kept from
voting because of his race or his color.”3 In contrast, a failure to give
secular reasons for law or state expressions that accompany
religious justifications and expressions is theocratic in my view
because it fails to comply with the need to make government action
justifiable to citizens who do not share one’s religious beliefs.
Citizens who regard each other as free and equal must be able to
give reasons for laws to each other who are not co-sectarians or
religious because it is not the business of the state to try to impose—
by coercive force—answers to the ultimate questions of life that
religious worldviews try to answer. The anti-theocracy principle is
therefore rooted in a basic commitment in democracy to equal
status. As an equal under law, I rightly demand government action
be based in reasons that that do not require me to accept any
particular theistic conception.
But while secular independence is necessary to make religious
reasons for law constitutionally valid, it is not sufficient. The second
criterion for religious state reasoning and expression requires that
the reasons for government action comport with the constitutional
value of equal status that underlies the anti-theocracy principle. It
is invalid for the state to use religious reasons that violate equal
status even if the reasons have secular equivalents. What I call the
1. President Lyndon B. Johnson, We Shall Overcome (Mar. 15, 1965) (transcript
available at https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/voting-rights-1965/johnson.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2022)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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equal status principle requires that the Supreme Court’s prohibition
on animus-based government action explicated in Romer v. Evans
requires that, even if a policy is religiously based and can be
translated into a secular rationale, those reasons still fail to be
legitimate bases for law if they violate the ideal that, under the law,
the idea of equal treatment bans status distinctions involving race,
gender, or LGBTQ identities.4
Together the anti-theocracy and equal status principles curtail
the role of religion in public life by prohibiting certain religious
justifications for law. But they also protect and delineate a role for
religious justifications for government action. Religious reasons
and expression have an important and legitimate role in public life
when they comport with the two principles because they often
serve to reinforce the idea within public reason that religious
justification often reinforces the core democratic commitment to
free and equal citizenship. I argue against purely secularist political
theories that government sponsored prayer should be welcomed
into the public realm when it comports with the anti-theocracy and
equal status principles. The anti-theocracy and equal status
principles thus push back both against religious conservatives who
aim for too capacious a role of religion in public life and secularist
liberals who would provide too small a public role for religion.
My argument draws from both the jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court and the tradition of public reason that was
particularly influential on the thought of James Madison and that
remains prominent in contemporary normative political theory.
Part II draws on the Court’s reasoning in Lukumi to show why the
Constitution’s protection of the free exercise of religion prohibits
the government from relying on theocratic reasons for lawmaking.
I read Lukumi in light of Locke’s seminal argument in the A Letter
Concerning Toleration about why theocratic reasoning threatens
religious freedom. In Part III, I draw on the Court’s opinion in
Romer v. Evans to argue that in addition to the anti-theocracy
principle, a second equal status principle is necessary to restrain
even religious reasons which have secular equivalents, but which
do not comport with the requirement that all persons should be
treated as equals under law regardless of their race, gender, or
LGBTQ status. I read Romer in light of Rawls’ account of public
4. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–36 (1996).

1130

1131

Praying for America

reason, specifically showing its usefulness in explicating the
“animus” doctrine the Court relied upon in Romer.
In Part IV, I examine the role the anti-theocracy and equal status
principles play in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, looking
closely at Town of Greece v. Galloway. I explain how the antitheocracy and equal status principles are an alternative to Justice
Kennedy’s “coercion test” and offer a needed clarification of Justice
O’Connor’s “endorsement test.” While much of the essay is
devoted to the limits on religious justifications required by the
anti-theocracy and equal status principles, this Part emphasizes
why public reason protects a prominent place for governmentsponsored religious expression.
Finally, in Part V, I turn to the Court’s most recent free exercise
cases, holding them up to the standard of the anti-theocracy and
equal status principles. I argue that in Masterpiece Cake Shop and
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Court has turned away from these
principles, and risks undermining its tradition of thinking about the
role of religious reasons in public life, even hinting at its own
theocratic reasoning, as well as disregarding the commitment to
LGBTQ rights prominent in cases like Romer.
I. FREE EXERCISE AND LIMITS ON THE STATE USING THEOCRATIC
REASONING: THE ANTI-THEOCRACY PRINCIPLE
Lukumi is one of the most influential and powerful statements
of the Court’s current approach to the free exercise of religion, and
thus, it is a natural starting point in discerning the principles of
religious freedom core to the Constitution.5 There, the Court
considered whether a ban on animal sacrifice by city officials in
Hialeah, Florida had intentionally targeted a minority religious
group, the Santería.6 The Santería practiced live animal sacrifice as
part of its religious practices.7 Hialeah’s law was designed to single
out animal “sacrifice” for criminal sanction, although similar forms
of animal slaughter were permitted for food processing.8 The Court
subjected the law to strict scrutiny and unanimously struck it down
on the grounds that the ban targeted the beliefs of the Santería
5.
6.
7.
8.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 545.
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religion and lacked a compelling interest that was narrowly
tailored.9 However, a crucial but often neglected point in the
Court’s opinion is that the government’s religious reasoning for
the law constituted an illegitimate purpose. Although the Court
did not pursue this path, pointing to the exclusively religious
reasoning for the law would have been enough for the Court to
strike the law down even on much less demanding rational basis
review.10 In examining the finding that the law was based in
animus, we can develop an account of how a restriction on
theocratic reasoning is crucial to free exercise protections.
Prior to Employment Division v. Smith, the Court had employed
a strict scrutiny test for protecting the free exercise of religion.11 The
strict scrutiny test required the government to show that it had a
compelling interest for denying exemptions to religious citizens
when laws substantially affected their core religious beliefs.12 The
government also had to demonstrate that it had no alternative
means to pursue its compelling interest other than denying the
exemption.13 The Court in Smith—in considering the
constitutionality of Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use for religious
purposes and its denial of a religious exemption allowing such a
use—replaced the strict scrutiny test with a weaker standard that
required the government to show merely a “rational basis” for
legislation that affects religious belief.14
While Smith concerned laws that have an unintended adverse
effect on religion, Lukumi raised issues regarding laws that
intentionally discriminate against a religion. The Court held that a
more demanding strict scrutiny test would be appropriate when
the state engages in purposeful religious discrimination. The Court
9. Id. at 546–47.
10. See id. at 547 (holding that “upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state
intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must
pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures”).
11. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For example, the Court applied strict
scrutiny in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
12. Smith, 494 U.S. at 907.
13. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“We must next consider whether some compelling
state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies
the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right. It is basic that no
showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice.”).
14. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (“[W]e cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively
invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect
an interest of the highest order.”).
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used several techniques to examine whether Hialeah’s law
intended to discriminate. First, the Court rejected arguments that
the law had a purpose other than discriminating against the
religious beliefs of the Santería. While the town claimed that the
law was concerned with animal welfare, the Court noted that
Hialeah did not outlaw other painful ways of killing animals, such
as in food processing.15
Second, the Court noted that on its face, the law seemed to
discriminate. Justice Scalia wrote in his concurring opinion that the
law’s use of the term “sacrifice” indicated an intent to discriminate
against the Santería.16 If the purpose was to stop animal cruelty,
the city council would have passed an ordinance without using a
religious reference like the word “sacrifice.”17 The city council
would have referred to animal slaughter in secular terms if it had
lacked discriminatory intent.
A third source used by the Court in Lukumi to find
discriminatory intent was the legislative record. Justice Kennedy
wrote in the majority opinion that the city council transcript
revealed a discriminatory motive.18 One councilman justified his
opposition to the practice of animal sacrifice by stating, “I don’t
believe that the Bible allows that.”19 The chaplain of the Hialeah
police department described Santería practices as “an
abomination to the Lord”and the worship of “demons.”20
The intent of the town councilmen to discriminate against the
Santería led the Court to subject the ordinance to strict scrutiny.
When laws have no intent to discriminate against religious belief,
like the drug regulations in Employment Division v. Smith, they are
subject only to rational basis analysis. Since the law in Lukumi was
discriminatory in intent, it was subject to the more demanding
standard of strict scrutiny. The Court’s decision in Lukumi thus
stands as a paradigm of securing the freedom of religious belief
15. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 527–28. (“The ordinance contained an exemption for
slaughtering by ‘licensed establishment[s]’ of animals ‘specifically raised for food purposes.’”).
16. Id. at 534–36.
17. Id. at 543. (“Despite the city’s proffered interest in preventing cruelty to
animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned
by religious sacrifice.”).
18. Id. at 541–42.
19. Id. at 541.
20. Id. at 541; Corey Brettschneider, A Transformative Theory of Religious Freedom:
Promoting the Reasons for Rights, 38 POL. THEORY 187 (2010).
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from intentional discrimination. The Santería’s beliefs, although
unpopular, were protected by the First Amendment guarantee of
the free exercise of religion.
But, less obviously, the evidence that the Court used to show
the intent to discriminate against the Santería also demonstrates
how the Constitution—properly—must sometimes limit the use of
religious reasons as a basis for law making. To protect the Santería’s
religious freedom, the Court had to reject the city council’s use of
religious reasons as the basis for law. As Justice Kennedy writes in
his majority decision, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits laws based
on animosity or animus towards a religion: “The Free Exercise
Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, and
upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention
stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all
officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the
Constitution and to the rights it secures.”21
Justice Kennedy says explicitly that constitutional laws cannot
be based on animus towards religion. But implicitly given that the
councilman employed religious reasons hostile to religion, his
statement should also stand as a rebuke to some forms of religious
reasoning itself. To the extent that the chaplain spoke in favor of the
law on the basis that the Santería practices were “‘an abomination
to the Lord,’and the worship of ‘demons,’”22 those sentiments were
based in religion and constituted animus because they were hostile
to religion. In other words, the religious statements of those in favor
of the law show that the animus doctrine does not protect the role
of all religious sentiment as a basis for law, particularly when
religion is used in opposition to other religions.
But what counts as an illegitimate religious reason hostile to
religion? This category includes animus but is much broader.
Consider, for instance, the statement of the councilman who
justified his support of the anti-Santería law on the grounds that “I
don’t believe that the Bible allows that.”23 That sentiment lacks the
hostility of labelling the Santería an “abomination.” It simply relies
on a religiously based authority to declare that the practices of the
Santería are prohibited. But such a form of reasoning is also

21. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547; Brettschneider, supra note 20.
22. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 541.
23. Id.
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illegitimate on the Court’s rational basis test because it lacks a
secular equivalent. The Santería are prohibited from their religious
practice simply because another religion prohibits it. That form of
reason is a paradigm of theocratic reasoning in that it would use a
form of reasoning—exclusive to one religion—to prohibit the
practice of another.
We can draw from that paradigmatic, illegitimate, theocratic
reasoning to discern a broader principle about the limits on
religious reasoning that are necessary to preserve its free exercise.
The law examined in Lukumi was a particularly egregious example
of constitutionally invalid “theocratic” forms of reasoning, not only
because it was based in animosity towards religion, but also
because it relied on an exclusively religious rationale to limit the
free exercise of another. Such reasoning would fail a rational basis
review because it would not meet the threshold requirement of
having a legitimate governmental purpose. The constitutional
violation lies in the lack of a secular equivalent for the claim that
the law is based in what the Bible requires.
To clarify why reasoning for law that lacks a secular translation
is invalid, it is helpful to turn to John Locke’s seminal statement of
religious freedom in the Letter Concerning Toleration, first published
in 1689. The Letter was a major influence on the thinking of James
Madison,24 and, given Madison’s role as the most important force
behind the passage and crafting of the First Amendment, it is an
essential source to understand the Constitution’s protection of
religious freedom. In his Letter, Locke argues that while religious
beliefs must be respected in a free society, they must not be allowed
to serve as the exclusive basis for lawmaking, lest a nation devolve
into theocratic reasoning,25 Locke asks his reader to imagine a
conflict between an Armenian and a Calvinist church, both of
which attempt to impose their theocratic principles on citizens.26 He
imagines that when each of the churches come to power it would
seek to impose its vision of true theology on the adherents of the
other church.27 Inevitably, Locke argues, the desire of each church
24. See Kevin Vance, The Golden Thread of Religious Liberty: Comparing the Thought of
John Locke and James Madison, 6 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 227 (2017).
25. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in LOCKE ON TOLERATION 3, 4–5
(Richard Vernon ed., 2010).
26. Id. at 14–15.
27. Id. at 15.
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to make law based on the true theological doctrine would result in
a limit on the religious practices by the other church that would
conflict with the true doctrine enforced by the other.28 But the
danger of theocracy also takes less obvious forms, Locke argues.
On his view, theocratic lawmaking is a danger within legislatures
that are not governed directly by religious figures when it is
governed by exclusively religious reasoning for two reasons. First,
the state is not qualified to judge the truth of different churches.
Only God can settle the question of which church is right, not the
government. As Locke writes,“[t]he verdict on this question rests
solely with the supreme judge of all men, and he alone will correct
the party in error.”29 Exclusively religious-based laws conflate
God’s judgment therefore with secular judgment.
Second, even if the state were qualified to judge the religious
truth of different churches, the coercive means available to it would
be inappropriate for inducing sincere and inward religious belief.
Imprisonment might compel outward conformity, but religious
belief must be held by the internal conscience of the individual,
which is beyond the reach of coercion. In Locke’s view, “fire and
sword are not suitable instruments for disproving errors and
forming or changing people’s minds.”30 Locke concludes that law
to avoid problems of theocracy must have a secular basis that can
be shared by persons regardless of whether they adhere to a
particular religious view. Religious freedom is therefore not just the
freedom to worship as one wishes; it is also the freedom from law
made without reasons that are based in the religion of the
legislature—reasons that not all citizens in a liberal democracy
should reasonably be expected to share.
Locke therefore uses the furthest reaching example of theocracy
in which one church attempts to establish itself as sovereign over
all matters to capture a more subtle danger of theocratic law
making. Specifically, laws within even procedurally democratic
regimes can carry with them the same dangers of theocracy found
in the example of the two feuding churches. Laws that appeal to
solely theological doctrines without secular equivalence replicate
the problem of theocracy writ largely because they impose a

28. Id.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id.
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religious belief on those who reasonably do not share it. Only
when law is based in secular reasons, he argues, can lawmakers
avoid the problem of theocracy.
Lukumi is a contemporary iteration of Locke’s example of the
two warring churches and an illustration of the dangers of
theocratic lawmaking within otherwise democratic systems of
government. Just as one church uses its own religious rationale to
limit the freedom of the other church in Locke’s letter, so too the
Christian councilmen were willing to use their religion to limit the
freedom of the Santería. But the violation of religious freedom in
Lukumi, as Locke shows us, is not only about the limit on the
Santería’s practices. The violation comes in the exclusively religious
reasoning employed by the councilmen. Even absent their obvious
hostility to the Santería, the council relied on what the Bible permits
or does not permit, unconstitutionally relying on religious beliefs
to prohibit the practices of the Santería. The councilmen therefore
illustrate Locke’s point that solely religious-based rationales as a
basis for law replicate the problem of theocracy. An anti-theocracy
principle is therefore rightly thought to be at the center of the Free
Exercise Clause. It prohibits not only religious reasoning hostile to
religious practice of the kind exemplified by the Hialeah chaplain
but also reasoning like the council’s that rely on justifications of
solely religious rationales.
The anti-theocracy principle, following Locke, requires that
religious justifications for law be translatable into secular
equivalents if they are to serve as a rational basis for law. Although
the anti-theocracy principle draws from Locke’s arguments in the
Letter, he mistakenly refused to extend religious freedom to those
groups he perceived as illiberal and also relied on an excessively
contingent account of the relationship between theocracy and true
belief. The anti-theocracy principle avoids these two mistakes. In
Locke’s view, people who advocated theocracy should be denied
religious freedom themselves. Locke was therefore notoriously
hostile to the notion that Catholics should be granted religious
freedom, because he believed they were wedded to the theocratic
notion that the Pope had both religious authority and the political
authority to rule on earth.31 Locke conflates the correct principle
31. For example, as Locke explains:
A church can have no right to be tolerated by a ruler if those who join it
transfer their loyalty and obedience to another prince simply by joining.
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that laws should be based on non-theocratic reasons with the
mistaken notion that people who hold theocratic beliefs should be
denied their rights.32 The great insight of the First Amendment is
that rights protections should not be conditioned on the beliefs of
rights holders. To return to Lukumi, it is irrelevant as a
constitutional matter whether or not members of the Santería
themselves reject theocracy. If it were entered into evidence that
Santería members wanted to pass laws discriminating against
Christian beliefs, this would not be sufficient to show the case was
wrongly decided. Locke, to the contrary, might condition the
Santería’s rights of free exercise on their rejection of theocratic
reasoning. But that is a misguided conflation of the concern to limit
theocracy, which concerns a danger of government making law
based on solely religious reasons with a matter of a person’s right
to free expression. Free exercise protections require restricting the
reliance on exclusively theocratic reasons as a legitimate basis for
law, but they do not limit the rights of those persons who
themselves endorse theocracy. Citizens have a right to advocate
theocratic beliefs, but not a right to use government power to
impose those beliefs on other citizens.
A second mistake made by Locke is that he rests his argument
for religious toleration in part on the ineffectiveness of state
coercion for compelling inward belief. But this aspect of his
argument is too contingent. If a form of coercion, such as
brainwashing, emerged that could force individuals to change their
minds and adopt a true religious belief, Locke’s argument would
be weakened since state coercion would be effective. By contrast,
the anti-theocracy principle is not based on contingent facts about
the ineffectiveness of state coercion, but rather on Locke’s more
fundamental point that theocratic reasons for law are invalid
because they wrongly impose upon non-believers laws based in
religious doctrines that non-believers have a right to reject based on
fundamental principles of religious tolerance.
The anti-theocracy principle would therefore prohibit
justifications for law based exclusively on religion but would still
Any ruler who granted such toleration would be giving a foothold in his own
territories and cities to a foreign jurisdiction; he would be giving permission
for soldiers to be conscripted from his own citizens against his own country.
Id. at 36.
32. Id.

1138

1139

Praying for America

admit many forms of religious reasoning as valid bases for law.
They key is that these reasons be translatable into secular reasons.
And the burden to avoid the anti-theocracy principle is not that
lawmakers explicitly do the translation. A principle of charitable
interpretation should allow a law to stand if it is potentially
grounded in non-theocratic reasons, and the theocratic reasons are
criticized as illegitimate for the state to invoke. The welldocumented difficulties in discerning the actual reasons for a
law suggest that it is appropriate to take an approach that is
generous to the motives of state legislators.33 Namely, there is
good reason for the Court to look at possible rather than actual
rationales to determine if legislation is based in theocratic reasons.
McGowan v. Maryland serves as an example of how the principle
of charity has operated in the Court’s jurisprudence of
Establishment.34 But it is equally valuable in discerning how to
think about rational basis under the Free Exercise Clause. In that
case Jewish store owners challenged the constitutionality of
Maryland’s so called “blue laws” that forced all businesses to
shutter their doors on Sunday.35 The owners contended that
Sunday closing improperly burdened their ability to observe the
Sabbath on Saturday when Jews traditionally observe their
theologically mandated day of rest.36 The Supreme Court denied
the Free Exercise claim and instead analyzed the laws on
Establishment grounds.37 It found that while historically the blue
laws had been based in a religious basis of mandating a Sunday
sabbath, over time that rationale had been replaced by a secular
one, namely that most people simply preferred to rest on Sunday.38
Despite the Court’s refusal to consider the case under the Free
Exercise Clause, it stands as a strong example of the reasoning
behind the anti-theocracy principle. The Court acknowledges that
a valid basis for law must have a secular equivalent and it is willing
33. Justice Scalia argues that the Court should reject the use of legislative histories
when interpreting statutes. As evidence he cites a senate floor debate involving Senator
Robert Dole, he suggests that “as for committee reports, it is not even certain that the
members of the issuing committees have found time to read them.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 32 (1997).
34. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
35. Id. at 422.
36. Id. at 429.
37. Id. at 453.
38. Id. at 434.
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to supplement the actual reasons given for a law with a possible
rationale.39 But what the Court failed to see in McGowen was that
the reason why a majority preferred Sunday to a Saturday closing
was itself based in religion. The Sunday closing favored the
Christian observation of the Sabbath. Even the principle of charity
would require striking down Maryland’s blue laws. An analysis
moreover that would have considered the store owner’s free
exercise claim would have made clear why the blue laws were not
innocuous. They were based in religious reasons that adversely
effected the free exercise of religion.
So far, I have focused on developing the anti-theocracy
principle as fundamental to the protection of Free Exercise. But the
anti-theocracy principle is not limited to a single clause. In the next
Parts I argue that the anti-theocracy principle is also central to the
logic of the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses and that it
needs to be supplemented with a distinct second principle.
II. ANIMUS AND THE LIMIT ON RELIGIOUS REASONS UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
In addition to the role the anti-theocracy principle plays in free
exercise jurisprudence, it is also essential to the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence, and it plays an important implicit role in
Romer v. Evans. But Romer also reveals a second principle that
compliments the anti-theocracy principle in limiting the role of
religious reasons as a legitimate basis for law. Even if religious
justifications for law can be translated into secular reasons, as the
anti-theocracy principle requires, those reasons must also be
consistent with an ideal of equal status regardless of race, gender,
or LGBTQ identities. I call this second limit on religious rationales
for lawmaking “the equal status principle” and it is essential to
understanding the reasoning behind the Court’s animus doctrine.
The anti-theocracy and equal status principles are related in that
both are justifiable by a deeper commitment to equality under law.
The anti-theocracy principle bans exclusively religious reasons for
law out of the belief that such reasons place one religious view in
a position of domination over those who do not share that religion.
The equal status principle extends that idea to other kinds of equal
status in democracy in cases of race, gender, or LBGTQ identity.
39. Id. at 436.
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A. The Anti-Theocracy and Equal Status Principles in the Animus
Doctrine of the Equal Protection Clause
To understand how anti-theocracy and equal status principles
work in tandem, it is helpful to first examine closely the history of
the Court’s animus doctrine. The Court has regularly invoked its
animus doctrine in major cases involving equal protection. In the
early versions of this doctrine, the Court’s test for animus was
whether the law or state actions showed “invidious
discrimination.” For example, the Court held in Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno that the government could not deny food
stamps to citizens who share a home but are unrelated by blood.40
The Court looked at the legislative record and found that the law
showed animus to “hippies” who co-habited.41
While the Court in Moreno cited the legislative record to show
that the law was based on animus, it applied a more general test for
animus in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.42 The test for
animus in Cleburne was the absence of a potentially legitimate
purpose for the law. The Court in the case struck down a zoning
ordinance that denied permits to build a group home for people
with cognitive disabilities.43 The Court ruled that the city’s only
potential basis for denying the permits was “irrational prejudice”
against people with cognitive disabilities.44
In both Moreno and Cleburne, the Court ruled that laws cannot
be based on reasons of animus. These cases concerned forms of bias
and discrimination that did not rely on religious reasoning. They
were examples of secular animus. But as with Lukumi, the Court’s
more recent gay rights decisions implicitly raise the question of
whether religious reasons can also violate the animus doctrine. In
Romer v. Evans, the Court struck down a Colorado referendum that
restricted gay rights in the areas of employment and housing.45 The
Court ruled that the only possible motivation for the referendum
was animus against gay people. Justice Kennedy argued in his
majority opinion that the law showed animus because its intent was
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538, 545 (1973).
Id. at 534.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 450.
Id.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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to lower the status of gay people below that of other persons.46 The
law targeted gay people as a group and singled them out to deny
their rights. Drawing on similar reasoning, the Court in United
States v. Windsor struck down the Defense of Marriage Act on the
grounds that it lowered the status of gay people and invidiously
discriminated against them.47 The very title of the “Defense of
Marriage Act” implied that gay people threatened marriage and
did not deserve the same marital rights of other citizens. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, argued that lowering the status
of people and invidiously discriminating against them cannot
constitute a “legitimate purpose,” even on rational basis review, the
Court’s least demanding level of scrutiny.48
As in Lukumi, in none of these cases does the Court explicitly
address the question of whether religious justifications might
themselves run afoul of the animus doctrine. But also as in Lukumi,
religious justifications did play a role in the passage of the
legislation at issues in these cases. For example, many of the
proponents of the discriminatory referendum in Romer based the
proposed amendment on religious reasons that condemned
homosexuality. Former University of Colorado football coach Bill
McCartney, board member of Colorado for Family Values, called
homosexuality “an abomination of almighty God.”49 While the
Court in Romer never explicitly examined the validity of these
religious reasons for law, they also did not find that they
constituted a legitimate purpose. Implicitly, therefore, as in Lukumi,
the Court recognized that exclusively religious reasons do not
constitute a legitimate basis for law.
Opponents of the Court’s decision might argue that religious
reasons are often based in love for the persons to whom animus is
46. Id. at 633.
47. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (“DOMA’s unusual
deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of
marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities
that come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a
law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the
unquestioned authority of the States.”).
48. Id. at 2696.
49. Adam Teicher, Schism Develops at Colorado Over Coach’s Beliefs, Comments, C HI.
T RIB. (Dec. 5, 1992), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-12-069204210057-story.html.
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supposedly shown. However, animus-based religious reasons
need not be motivated by a feeling of hate to lack a legitimate
Constitutional purpose. For example, some proponents of the antigay referendum claimed, “God calls us to hate the sin but love the
sinner.”50 They said that they were motivated not by hatred of
gays, but by a desire to save them from sin. But that sentiment is
not a legitimate purpose, even if it is not based in hate per se,
because it fails to respect the equal status of gays.
If animus is not defined by hate, how are we to understand this
doctrine? Although it has never been identified as part of the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, I propose that implicit in its
jurisprudence on the role religious reasons can play in public life,
the Court’s decisions are delineated by the anti-theocracy and equal
status principles, just as they were in the realm of Free Exercise.
Specifically, the argument that the Colorado law was needed to
“save” gay persons was rightfully rejected by the Court as a
rational basis because it violates the anti-theocracy principle. The
reasoning for the law was theocratic because it sought to
impose a religious conception on people in a way that could not be
supported by any legitimate secular justification. Legitimate
governmental purposes must be based on reasons based in law
that can appeal to citizens who are non-religious, and this kind of
justification failed that requirement.
While the argument that the Colorado law was based in a desire
to save sinners is paradigmatically anti-theocratic, a more nuanced
attempt to translate religious arguments into secular ones was
made by “new natural law” thinkers, John Finnis and Robert
George, who gave testimony in defense of the Colorado
referendum in Romer. George and Finnis claimed that their
arguments were based in biblical teaching but that their arguments
in defense of the Colorado law met the standard of rational basis
because they were able to translate them into secular terms. It is
therefore useful to examine their arguments to clarify the
requirements of the anti-theocracy principle. The Supreme Court

50. Chuck Colson, Who are the Hatemongers?, B REAK P OINT
https://www.breakpoint.org/who-are-the-hatemongers/.

( Jan. 5, 1993),
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refused to accept (or even address) their claims as a rational basis
for the Colorado law. But was the Court incorrect in doing so?51
George and Finnis argue that laws that discriminate against
LGBTQ people enforce an idea of “sexual complementarity” and
derive a rational basis from this fundamental principle of sexual
and family morality.52 This argument claims that the physical
features of heterosexual relations make these couples “fit” together
in a way that gay couples do not.53 Sexual complementarity for
George and Finnis is what makes possible the “one flesh union”
only possible within heterosexual marriage. Such arguments
purport to translate religious doctrine prohibiting gay sex and gay
marriage into secular terms. The admittedly biblically based idea of
a “one flesh union” can be translated, according to George and
Finnis, into a secular argument about the exclusive sexual
complementarity of heterosexual couples.54 As George put it,
“complementarity . . . makes it possible for two human beings
to become, in the language of the Bible, one flesh . . . .”55 But it is
difficult to understand in secular terms without the aid of biblical
or theological explanation why gay bodies physically fit with one
another less well than straight bodies. Nor is it understandable on
secular terms why a supposed empirical point about bodies fitting
together is salient enough normatively to justify denying marital
rights to gay people. George and Finnis purport to translate the
biblical idea of “one flesh union” into a secular argument from
“sexual complementarity,” but from a secular perspective, the
argument is incomprehensible without the biblical explanation. It
is telling that in his testimony “one flesh” is actually the reason that
makes complementarity normatively valuable, but that is an idea
that he explicated by referencing “the language of the [B]ible.”

51. Rebuttal Affidavit of John Finnis (Oct. 21, 1993), Evans v. Romer, 63 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,719 (Colo. D. Ct. 1993), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 92CV7223); Rebuttal Affidavit of Robert George (Oct. 22, 1993), id.
52. ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF
LIBERAL SECULARISM 32 (2013).
53. John Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, in SAME S EX: D EBATING
THE E THICS, S CIENCE , AND C ULTURE OF H OMOSEXUALITY 31 (John Corvino ed., 1997);
Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, Quaestio Disputata: What Male-Female Complementarity
Makes Possible: Marriage as a Two-In-One-Flesh Union, 69 T HEOLOGICAL S TUD . 641 (2008).
54. Id.
55. Robert P. George, What Marriage Is—And What It Isn’t, FIRST THINGS (Aug. 2009),
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/08/what-marriage-is-and-what-it-isnt.
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Finnis and George illustrate, despite their ambitions, why merely
claiming to translate the religious to the secular is not enough to
avoid conflict with the anti-theocracy principle.
While the argument for bodily complementarity stands as an
example of a religiously based argument that cannot successfully
be translated into secular terms and thus fails the anti-theocracy
principle, other religious rationales for limiting LGBTQ rights can
more easily be translated into secular terms. But the Court has
made it clear that translation of religious arguments into secular
arguments is not sufficient to show them to be legitimate rational
bases for law. In other words, the anti-theocracy principle is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for a rationale to rise to the
level of a rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause. Consider
the argument that since the purpose of marriage is procreation and
gay people cannot procreate, they can be denied rights to marry.
That argument has a religious basis in the idea of a “one flesh
union” and related biblical rationales. But unlike the idea of
“sexual complementarity,” it does translate into a secular
argument. Yet that argument was not accepted by the Court in
Romer or any decision since as a reason to deny LGBTQ rights.
Indeed, as scholars like Princeton political theorist Stephen Macedo
and Justice Kagan have pointed out, the procreation argument
would also justify laws banning marriage by straight infertile
couples, clearly an unconstitutional result.56 The procreative
argument is an example of a reason for a law that can be translated
into a secular purpose but fails to meet a second principle that
religious reasons must satisfy if they are to be legitimate bases for
lawmaking: the equal status principle. The equal status principle
says that only those religious reasons which have been successfully
translated into secular terms are valid if they are consistent with the
equal status of people based on race, gender, and LGBTQ identities.

56. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013)
(No. 12-144) (Justice Kagan says: “[S]uppose a State said because we think that the
focus of marriage really should be on procreation, we are not going to give marriage
licenses anymore to any couple where both people are over the age of 55. Would that
be constitutional?”).
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B. Public Reason and the Normative Rationale of Anti-Theocracy and
Equal Status Principle
So far in this Part I have grounded the equal status and secular
independence requirements in the Court’s free exercise and equal
protection jurisprudence. Now I move to consider a wider
normative framework for defending the two principles. We have
already begun this work in considering the foundations of free
exercise law in the work of John Locke. Now I turn to a more
contemporary debate in the field of political theory on the role of
religious reasons in public life. Specifically, political theorists have
addressed that topic as part of a broader consideration about
“public reason.” Prominently, theorist Jürgen Habermas defends a
wide view of the role of religious reasons in public debate,
accepting the anti-theocracy principle but rejecting the equal status
principle.57 According to Habermas, excluding religious reasons
from government risks alienating religious citizens. He also
suggests that religious reasons have epistemic value, enlightening
secular citizens with ideas that can then be translated into terms
they can understand.58 There is a contradiction, however, between
Habermas’s desire for a wide range of religious views as a basis for
government action and his acceptance of the anti-theocracy
principle. The reason why Habermas accepts the burden of
translating religious to secular views is that he acknowledges a
duty of equality. As the anti-theocracy principle states, it would be
a denial of the equal status of citizens to force them to live under a
coercive regime based on religious reasons they rejected. But if
Habermas accepts the underlying ideal of equal status that lies
beneath the anti-theocracy principle, then he also should
acknowledge the importance of limiting religious reasons that deny
that principle.59
The Court’s embrace of the equal status principle means that it
has rejected Habermas’s broad idea of the role of religious reasons
57. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
99–148 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2008).
58. Id. at 5. For example, he suggests that “contributions formulated in religious
language could have a rational content.” Id.
59. For a more elaborate response to Habermas, see COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER,
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF GOVERNMENT 28–53 (2007); Anna Stilz, On the
Relation Between Democracy and Rights, 47 REPRESENTATION 9, 9–17 (2011) (excellent analysis
of my critique of Habermas).

1146

1147

Praying for America

when it comes to the justifications of law.60 A better fit with the
Court’s view is found in the view of public reason defended by John
Rawls, especially in his essay “The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited.”61 That approach explains more carefully than
Habermas does how public reason might balance the inclusion of
religious reasons as a basis for law and the benefits of the rights of
minorities. And it highlights the normative justification behind the
Court’s approach in cases like Romer. Rawls argues for a “proviso”
to the requirement of public reason that all laws be potentially
justifiable to free and equal citizens on the basis of their shared
status, not on theological or other “comprehensive” doctrines that
they can reasonably reject.62 The proviso clarifies that religious
reasons have a fundamental role in public life as long as they are
translatable in secular terms and respect the equal status of persons.
In Rawls’s view, when we decide on laws, we must consider
whether state actions can be made justifiable to citizens who do not
share our religious beliefs. It must be possible for us to give reasons
for laws to other citizens who are not co-sectarians or religious. This
allows us to reason together based on a common set of ideals,
including respect for rights, equal status, and the aims of
government given by the Constitution.63 Rawls’s argument is that
reasonable people, who respect each other’s rights, can disagree on
matters of religion, including the existence of God, the afterlife, and
the question of what gives life ultimate meaning. Not only do
people reasonably disagree about religious issues, but they should
have the freedom to do so under liberty of conscience.64 It is
therefore not the business of the state to try to impose by coercive
force answers to these questions. Even if a law is not literally
coercively imposing a religious view, we can discern from Locke’s
argument in the Letter that when law is exclusively based on
religious reasons, it disrespects the equal status of citizens who do
not endorse the religious view from which those reasons were
derived. The proviso makes clear that public reason’s limits on
religious reasons, far from dispensing of all religious justification
60. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2005).
61. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997).
62. See R AWLS, supra note 60, at 215–19; BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 59, at 7–27.
63. For a brief description, see R AWLS, supra note 60, at 216–19.
64. Id. at 36, 54–56 (describing the fact of reasonable pluralism and the burdens
of judgment).
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for law, still protects a place for religious reasons as a basis for law
so long as they can be translated into secular terms and are
consistent with the idea of equal status.
One argument in favor of Habermas’s approach to public
reason over Rawls could turn to the role theological arguments
have often played in the adoption and implementation of the
promises of equal protection itself. For example, Martin Luther
King, Jr. drew on his Christian beliefs to support desegregation and
racial equality.65 The distinctively religious contributions to these
debates cannot be denied. And a conception of public reason
that would rule those views illegitimate would do away with
major foundations of the principles of public reason itself. But
far from counting against the equal status principle, King’s
example bolsters the normative case for the anti-theocracy and
equal status principles and generally for the Rawlsian approach to
public reason.
King’s writing, especially his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, is an
exemplar of how theological views should inform the law. In the
letter, King appeals partly to theological ideals such as Aquinas’s
notion of natural law, biblical references like the Babylonian
captivity and the teachings of Jesus.66 King asks rhetorically, “Was
not Jesus an extremist in love?”67 King uses Jesus and other
theological sources to defend his use of civil disobedience and in
his general arguments against segregation. But alongside those
religious appeals come secular and independent principles.
Specifically, as much as the letter builds on these religious
arguments, it carefully translates those arguments into
independent secular reasons. In the letter, for instance, King argues
that “an unjust law is a code that a majority inflicts on a minority
that is not binding on itself.”68 When President Johnson paid
homage to King and other leaders in the civil rights movement in
his famous “We Shall Overcome” speech, he, like King, gave
religious reasons for the movement, but those reasons were
consistent with equality and were accompanied by secular

65. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in I HAVE A DREAM:
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 83–100 (James Washington ed., 1992).
66. Id. at 84, 89, 92, 94.
67. Id. at 94.
68. Id. at 89.
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reasons supporting the Voting Rights Act.69 By contrast, the
Hialeah ordinance against the Santería and the Colorado anti-gay
referendum were illegitimate attempts to impose religious beliefs.
The reasons for the Hialeah and Colorado laws were theocratic,
failing both the equal status and secular independence
requirements. Therefore, King and Johnson, far from offering
counterexamples to the anti-theocracy and equal status principles,
exemplify how religious leaders can bring their own theological
views to reinforce fundamental constitutional ideals in defense of
these principles.
In sum, religious reasons can support independent secular
principles consistent with the principles underlying the Free
Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses. It is only when religious
reasons lack a secular equivalent or when they conflict with the
ideal of equal status that they are illegitimate for the government to
use and fail to constitute a rational basis for law under these two
clauses. In cases in which the anti-theocracy principle is violated,
laws that fail to have secular rationales treat non-co-religionists as
less than equal. That deeper commitment to equality in turn is also
recognized in the equal status principles’ protection against those
religious views that can be translated into secular terms but that
undermine the equality of persons based on their racial, gender, or
LGBTQ identities.
III. THE LIMITS ON RELIGIOUS STATE SPEECH
In this Part, I turn from the question of what kinds of religious
reasons can serve as the basis for secular law to consider what kind
of state speech or expression is legitimate under the anti-theocracy
and equal status principles.70 If the state cannot constitutionally use
theocratic reasons or those that violate the equal status principle as
the basis for legislation or coercive state action, it is also prohibited
from using such rationales as the basis for its own speech or
expressive state action.
In my view, state speech is unconstitutional when it violates
the requirements of the anti-theocracy or equal status principles.
69. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Address to a Joint Session of Congress
on Voting Legislation: We Shall Overcome (Mar. 15, 1965).
70. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S.
565 (2014); COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY?:
HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY (2012).
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These principles provide an alternative to the coercion test
proposed by Justice Kennedy.71 Kennedy claims that religious
state speech is inappropriate when it coercively forces a message
on citizens.72 The anti-theocracy principle differs in explaining why
the government should be excluded from using theocratic state
speech, even when the speech is non-coercive. For example, the
anti-theocracy principle can show why a non-binding government
declaration that Islam is a false religion would be a prohibited
form of state speech since it would violate the anti-theocracy
principle. Likewise, a secular expression claiming “Islam is an evil
religion” would also violate the equal status principle.
In addition to offering an alternative to the coercion test in
establishment jurisprudence, the anti-theocracy principle’s ban on
theocratic state speech can also inform the meaning of the Court’s
formal test of Establishment as outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman.73 The
first prong of the test outlined in Lemon requires that all
government action endorse a secular purpose.74 This prong of the
Lemon test is in agreement with the secular independence
requirement of the anti-theocracy principle. However, the Court
has been vague regarding what would be a legitimate secular
purpose for state speech to endorse. I clarify that legitimate state
speech must comport with the anti-theocracy principle. And it
would add a requirement of respect for equal status, which is
missing from the Lemon test. Together, the anti-theocracy and equal
status principles define what would be a legitimate secular
purpose by importing the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,
especially the gay rights cases of Romer and Windsor, into the first
prong of Lemon.

71. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659–79
(1989), abrogated by Galloway, 572 U.S. 565.
72. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 586 (“It is an elemental First Amendment principle that
government may not coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise.’”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“It is beyond dispute that, at a
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in religion or its exercise[.]”).
73. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (“Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”) (internal citations omitted).
74. Id. at 612.
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I also argue that the anti-theocracy and equal status principles
help to clarify Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, as outlined in
Lynch v. Donnelly.75 Critics suggest the test is imprecise because it
relies on a “reasonable observer”76 to determine whether the
government has endorsed religion. I argue the test should more
explicitly be defined using the anti-theocracy and equal status
principles. State speech that invokes religion to endorse equality is
permissible, while religious state speech that sends a message of
inequality based on religious affiliation, gender, race, or sexual
orientation is banned under the Establishment Clause.
In addition to offering an account of how the anti-theocracy and
equal status principles clarify the role of religious state expression
under the Establishment Clause, I also aim in this Part to further
demonstrate that these principles are consistent with some state
sponsored religious expression, including some state sponsored
prayer. I thus continue to offer a reply to the objection to these
principles, which accuses them of unduly excluding religion from
a place in public life.
A. Why Extend Anti-Theocracy from Coercion to Expression?
Before examining how the anti-theocracy and equal status
principles clarify the Establishment Clause approach to legitimate
government speech, I first need to better justify extending the equal
status and secular independence requirements to state expressive
action. Although I have focused so far on limiting theocratic
reasons from serving as the basis for coercively enforced state laws,
I take the argument also to show that theocratic reasons have no
rightful role in the state expression. For example, consider the
hypothetical case of a state government putting up advertisements
criticizing gay people without passing laws to punish them.
While there would be no coercive anti-gay law, the advertisements
would be illegitimate on similar grounds. In both instances, the
state would be wrong to send a message of unequal status.
The expressive harm to equal status would be present in both
laws discriminating against gay people as well as in state speech
that denigrates gay people. This hypothetical example of state
speech would fail to meet the standard of rational review. Like the
75. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
76. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Colorado referendum in Romer, there would be no reason for the
anti-gay advertisements that would constitute a legitimate
government purpose. The fact that the advertisements would be an
act of state expression rather than coercion makes no difference in
discerning the rationality of the state’s reasons. In both cases it
would fail rational review.
We can apply this kind of analysis to the Free Exercise Clause
as well. Imagine that instead of having a ban on animal sacrifice,
the Hialeah councilmen only issued condemnations of the Santería
practice of animal sacrifice. This would not be a coercive law, but it
would still have all the failures associated with the ordinance at
issue in Lukumi. It would intentionally target religious belief, and it
would also fail rational basis review because it would be based on
an illegitimate governmental purpose.77
These examples suggest that there should be constitutional
limits on purely expressive state speech. But an objection to my
application of the anti-theocracy and equal status principles to
expressive state speech might suggest that expression, unlike
coercion, lacks the potential to harm. The claim that there is no
harm in racist or discriminatory state speech, however, lacks clear
empirical support. Expression by the state might damage citizens
psychologically. But more fundamentally, apart from issues of
harm, the anti-theocratic and equal status principles concern the
question of what government action is legitimately authorized
under the Constitution. What matters in assessing legitimate law is
not just the effect of law but the legitimacy of the reasons for it.
Consider two laws where the coercive impact is the same but the
constitutional validity of the reasons for the law differs. For
instance, compare the Hialeah ordinance with an alternative law
that would ban inhumane animal slaughter, but without the intent
to discriminate against the Santería. The alternative ban would
prohibit animal slaughter, like the Hialeah ordinance, but it would
be constitutional because the reason for it would be the legitimate
aim of preventing unnecessary suffering. By contrast, the Hialeah
councilmen’s reason for their ordinance was theocratic and
discriminated against a religious group. This example shows that
the reasons for a law can be determinative in assessing its
77. For a related series of examples and an excellent analysis of establishment limits
on government expression, see Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV.
648 (2013).
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constitutionality apart from the harmful effects that it might or
might not have. Theocratic reasons, like those used by the
Hialeah councilmen, are invalid reasons for laws. But if the
difference in whether a law is valid is based in the reasoning for a
law rather than its effect, this suggests that the expressive aspect of
the law must be considered in determining its constitutionality.
The relevance of the reasons for a law in evaluating its
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause can also be seen
in James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments.78 In this writing, Madison criticized a tax to support
religious teaching in the state of Virginia.79 Today, under modern
free exercise jurisprudence, it would be clearly unconstitutional to
levy a selective tax for the specific purpose of supporting religious
teaching. But a number of precedents also show that it would be
unconstitutional to fund religious education using part of the
proceeds from a more general tax because the funding would have
no “secular purpose.”80 What makes this state funding
unconstitutional is not the coercion involved, but that the reason
for the law is to give government support for a particular religion.81
If there are constitutional limits on legitimate reasons for law,
it follows that there also should be limits on government
expression because government sponsored speech makes

78. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES M ADISON (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006).
79. Id.
80. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 436 (1961).
81. In contrast to the limits I want to defend on state speech, Michael McConnell
argues that a general tax, which is only partly used to fund a religion, would be
constitutional. However, this position is inconsistent with McConnell’s
acknowledgement that it would be unconstitutional for the state to impose a specific tax
for the sole purpose of funding a religion. Both the specific and general tax involves a
similar state action. They are capable of collecting equivalent funds for the purpose of
supporting a religion. More fundamentally, the general tax is similar to the specific tax
in inflicting an expressive harm on citizens of other religions. The state sends the
message that it treats citizens unequally based on their religion. In both cases, the state
singles out a religion to fund. The general and specific taxes are unconstitutional because
of the state’s theocratic reason for them and the message it sends in violation of the equal
status requirement. The Court is therefore right to conclude that there can be an
expressive harm from the state spending money on religion, regardless of whether that
revenue was raised in a general or specific tax. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment
and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 W M . & M ARY L.
R EV . 2105 (2003).
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transparent its purposes and rationales. If government is prohibited
from relying on certain religious reasons for law, it follows that it
should also be prohibited from directly endorsing through its own
speech these constitutionally prohibited reasons. The antitheocracy and equal status principles therefore should be
understood as limiting not only state coercive action but also state
expressive action, including state speech and its reasons for law.
Applying the anti-theocracy and equal status principles gives
us reason to rethink Justice Kennedy’s “coercion test.” In Lee v.
Weisman, Justice Kennedy’s majority decision struck down
graduation prayers because they violate the First Amendment
restriction on the state establishment of religion.82 Lee concerned a
prayer given by an invited Rabbi at a public middle school
graduation ceremony.83 Although the prayer was not sectarian, a
Jewish student objected to the public-school prayer on
Establishment grounds.84
The Court’s opinion did not focus on the religious content of
the prayer, but on the circumstances surrounding student
attendance. Even though attendance was technically optional, the
Court reasoned students felt compelled to attend.85 Justice Kennedy
argued that state actions could be coercive if people subjectively felt
they were being coerced.86 The case has come to be known for its
coercion test that religious state speech violates the Establishment
Clause if people believe they are forced to listen to the speech or
adopt its viewpoint, regardless of its content.87
I do not object to this principle as an aspect of the Establishment
Clause. But it would be a mistake to see the “coercion test” as the
exclusive meaning of the Establishment Clause. Such an approach
would read the clause as restricting coercion but as placing no
restrictions on the content of religious state speech. One problem
with this approach is that the Court has implausibly stretched
the meaning of coercion in trying to maintain a content-free test.
But defining coercion as the feeling of being coercive would be
too broad and subjective. When people claim to feel coerced it
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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might simply reflect their disagreement with a viewpoint. But
disagreement does not make speech coercive.
The major problem with the coercion test, however, is that it
fails to incorporate the lessons of the anti-theocracy and equal
status principles. Instead of straining the meaning of coercion in the
establishment context, it would be more transparent and consistent
with the jurisprudence in other clauses to say that religious state
speech can be problematic because of its content.88 A content-based
analysis would prohibit the government from employing theocratic
state speech or speech that violates the equal status of citizens.
To be clear, the anti-theocracy principle and the equal status
principles rightly restrict state speech by the government. Ordinary
citizens have the free speech right to express any viewpoint without
legal restriction, but public officials are entrusted with government
power and have a constitutional duty to refrain from theocratic
state speech or speech that violates the equal status principle in
their official capacity.
B. The Endorsement Test
My attempt to define a content-based limit to state expression
is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s broad ambition in her
“endorsement test.” O’Connor’s test prohibits the government
from engaging in speech that a reasonable observer would interpret
as “endorsing” religion. She proposed the test in her concurring
opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, a
case that concerned a city’s display of a menorah next to a

88. McConnell has defended the notion that the original understanding of the
Constitution is incompatible with the Court’s ruling in Lemon v. Kurtzman. He would
abandon the first prong of Lemon, which requires that legislation have a secular purpose.
McConnell instead endorses the coercion test, under which government religious speech
is valid as long as it does not coerce citizens into listening or agreeing with the speech.
See Michael W. McConnell, Stuck with a Lemon, 83 A.B.A. J. 46 (1997). However,
McConnell’s argument is at odds with James Madison’s argument from his Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which inspired the Constitution’s religious
clauses and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. Madison argued that a tax to
fund religious schooling violated the religious liberty of citizens. For Madison, it was
not the coercive aspect of the tax that was problematic since taxes for other purposes
could be legitimate. Instead, he objected to the theocratic reason for the tax. The
legitimacy of the tax could not be determined solely on coercive grounds, but only by
examining the content of the state’s reason for the tax. See Madison, supra note 78.
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Christmas tree on public property.89 O’Connor argued that while
displaying a menorah alone might be seen by a reasonable observer
as endorsing Judaism, the menorah did not constitute an
endorsement of Christianity when it was included in a larger
holiday display next to a Christmas tree.90 The city’s display was
not specific to any one religion but celebrated pluralism more
generally.91 In the same case, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a city’s display of a crèche or Christian Nativity
scene with the statement “Glory to God in the highest” written in
Latin.92 Justice Blackmun wrote in a majority opinion joined by
Justice O’Connor that the city was endorsing religion by displaying
the crèche:
There is no doubt, of course, that the crèche itself is capable of
communicating a religious message. Indeed, the crèche in this
lawsuit uses words, as well as the picture of the Nativity scene,
to make its religious meaning unmistakably clear . . . . This praise
to God in Christian terms is indisputably religious—indeed
sectarian—just as it is when said in the Gospel or in a
church service.93

O’Connor’s endorsement test has been widely criticized for
being too vague. The concern is that she rests the test on the idea of
a “reasonable observer.”94 What matters for O’Connor is not the
religious intent of the state’s expression, but whether an observer
would recognize the expression as having religious content.95
Despite its ambiguity, O’Connor is right in developing an objective
test for establishment that focuses on the content of the expression.
This objective test resembles the proper understanding of the
animus doctrine. The animus doctrine has shifted away from a
subjective test that examines whether legislators were motivated by
a hateful intent in passing a law. A subjective test of animus would
mistakenly invalidate state expression that might reasonably
89. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
627–37 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572
U.S. 565 (2014).
90. Id. at 634–35.
91. See id. at 635.
92. Id. at 579–80 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 598 (internal citations omitted).
94. Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
95. Id.
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interpreted as having a legitimate secular basis, even if its
motivation were explicitly religious. Acknowledging this problem,
the animus doctrine now considers whether a law could have a
possible reason for it that is compatible with equal status. Like the
modern animus doctrine, O’Connor’s test shifts the focus away
from the subjective intent to the objective content of a law or state
action. Her endorsement test recognizes that regardless of whether
there is a partly religious intent, state expression might be
acceptable if its content can be understood on secular terms.
Although the endorsement test has the advantage of being
objective, O’Connor is unclear about whether it rules out all
religious expression by the state as unconstitutional, or whether it
would allow state religious expression that avoids animus or
theocratic state expression. O’Connor sums up the endorsement
test in Allegheny as follows:
If government is to be neutral in matters of religion, rather than
showing either favoritism or disapproval towards citizens
based on their personal religious choices, government cannot
endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens
without sending a clear message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders or less than full members of the political community.96

Part of her description of the endorsement test suggests an
interpretation that would make it consistent with the anti-theocracy
and equal status principles. According to this reading, the
endorsement test evaluates the constitutionality of religious state
speech based on its respect for citizens’ equal status. O’Connor
seems to support this interpretation, writing that the question is
whether the state’s message conveys that some citizens are “less
than full members of the political community.”97 On such a view,
there would be nothing inherently constitutionally problematic
about the government giving a religious reason that supports
independent secular values and that respects equal status.
At times, O’Connor appears, however, to have a different
understanding of the endorsement test, one that would be
inconsistent with the anti-theocracy and equal status principles.
She seems to claim that when the government approves of a
religious argument, it inherently sends a message of disrespect
96. Id. at 627.
97. See id.
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to non-religious citizens. As O’Connor writes, the “government
cannot endorse the religious practices and beliefs of some citizens”
without sending a disrespectful message.98 Unlike the antitheocracy principle, this second reading of O’Connor’s
endorsement test would rule out all religious state speech, even if
the speech supports the constitutional value of equality.
The second version of the endorsement test would be too
restrictive. It would fail to recognize that religious state speech
could serve independent secular principles. Consider the recently
constructed Martin Luther King Memorial, which is run by the
National Park Service on government land. The King Memorial is
a paradigmatic example of state speech, endorsing both King’s
secular and sectarian arguments for racial equality.99 The Memorial
quotes his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, which invoked the Christian
doctrine of natural law along with secular arguments to oppose
segregation.100 It recognizes how King, as a religious leader,
invoked the gospel for the secular purpose of ending
discrimination.101 Its very structure alludes to Moses and the idea
that “[w]ith this faith, we will be able to hew out of a mountain
of despair.”102 By building the memorial, the state is endorsing
King’s religious message to support a non-sectarian conception of
equal rights.
The Jefferson Memorial similarly draws on religious arguments
for the secular purpose of strengthening equal rights. The Memorial
is inscribed with Jefferson’s preamble to the Declaration of
Independence that “all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights[.]”103
Jefferson’s statement is religious, invoking the “Creator,” but it is
in the service of the constitutional aim of equal rights. In the
northwest wall, the Memorial quotes another religious argument
from Jefferson:
Almighty God hath created the mind free . . . . [A]ll attempts
to influence it by temporal punishments, or burthens . . . are a
98. Id.
99. K ING , supra note 65.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 84–85.
102. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial, TR. NAT’L M ALL, https://nationalmall.org/
m onum ents-m em orials/m lk (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
103. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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departure from the plan of the [H]oly [A]uthor of our
religion . . . . [N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship . . . or ministry . . . [or] shall
otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief;
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to
maintain, their opinions in matters of religion.104

The Memorial inscription is an example of state religious
speech that would be permissible under the anti-theocracy
principle. The Jefferson Memorial quotation makes the religious
argument that God created the conscience to be free. But the
inscribed passage is not limited to having a purely sectarian
purpose. Jefferson’s statement more broadly supports the
legitimate constitutional purpose of protecting religious freedom.
The anti-theocracy principle allows the state to cite religion in
bolstering independent freestanding principles of equality, as in the
official memorials to Martin Luther King and Thomas Jefferson.
According to the anti-theocracy principle, the problem with the
display of the crèche in Alleghany is that it seems only to further the
aims of one religion. It does not use religion or religious language
to endorse an independent secular ideal that could be shared by
citizens who are not Christians. When the state displays the crèche,
it does not clarify how its religious expression is consistent with the
equality of non-Christians. Absent any clarification, a reasonable
observer can interpret the display as the state endorsing
Christianity as the exclusive government understanding of God.
The absence of a secular purpose for the display would violate the
anti-theocracy principle, while the state expression of inequality
towards citizens would violate the equal status requirement. The
principles would rule out the display of a crèche because it reflects
the state endorsement of Christianity, instead of the inclusive
message of supporting constitutional rights.
In sum, O’Connor’s restriction on the government endorsement
of religion is often thought to be too vague. It relies on a notion of
a reasonable observer without clarifying what kinds of
endorsement would bepermissible in the eyes of that observer. By
contrast, the anti-theocracy and equal status principles makes
secular equivalence and respect for equal citizenship the explicit
104. Thomas Jefferson, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 229, 229–32 (Edwin S. Gaustad & Mark
A. Noll eds., 2003).
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standards for whether state religious speech is constitutionally
permissible or impermissible.
C. The First Prong of Lemon: Secular Purpose
The anti-theocracy principle also improves upon and clarifies
the Court’s “secular purpose” analysis. According to the first prong
of the Lemon test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, a law must have a
“secular legislative purpose.”105 I argue that “secular purpose” is
too subjective and that the test for respecting the Establishment
Clause should be understood in terms of the anti-theocracy
principle. Namely, the question should not be about whether the
intent of law was secular but rather whether the reasons for it can
be translated into secular reasons. Furthermore, that prong should
require reasons consistent with the equal status principle.
In Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court invoked the first prong of the
Lemon test to strike down a law that required the teaching of
“creation science” alongside evolution in biology classes.106 Justice
Brennan argued in his majority opinion that the creation science
requirement had only a religious purpose, as there was no scientific
evidence to support creationism.107 In Brennan’s words,
The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by
requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from
public school classrooms or the presentation of a religious
viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety. The Act violates
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it seeks
to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to
achieve a religious purpose.108

In Brennan’s view, the government had no secular purpose in
passing the Louisiana Creationism Act.
There is a clear overlap between Brennan’s application of
the secular purpose prong and the anti-theocracy principle.
Brennan rightly strikes down a policy that is based exclusively
on a religious ideal and cannot be translated or explained to

105. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
106. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (directing that the law did not
mandate the teaching of Christian Science unless evolution was also taught; the
legislation thus sought equal time for the two theories of the start of life).
107. See id. at 594–96.
108. Id. at 596–97.
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non-religious citizens. But despite this point of agreement, there is
a question as to whether he would rule out all school policies that
would teach approvingly about religion. Consider whether the
Establishment Clause ever allows public school students to think
about whether their religion might lead them to endorse certain
constitutional values, such as the idea of equal protection. Such an
assignment might give Martin Luther King’s Letter from a
Birmingham Jail as an example of how religious beliefs might inform
or motivate constitutional ideals. If we asked students to engage in
such a debate, would such an assignment be a form of
unconstitutional religious endorsement? Brennan’s opinion is
unclear here. The Court might view such a lesson as purposeful
encouragement of religion that constitutes endorsement under
Lemon’s first prong. However, I would view the assignment as
being consistent with the anti-theocracy principle. It asks
students to consider their own views about the ways religion might
reinforce secular constitutional values. Such an assignment would
contrast with a school lesson that promotes religious racist views
that undermine equality and are theocratic. The anti-theocracy
principle thus clarifies why the exclusion of theocratic publicschool lessons that aim to undermine secular purposes should not
be confused with an exclusion of religion from public life.
The anti-theocracy principle also offers a way to rethink the
Court’s cases about displays of the Ten Commandments under the
Establishment Clause. In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the
Court considered whether it was constitutional for a county
courthouse to display the Ten Commandments.109 The Court ruled
that the government display was unconstitutional because it
endorsed a sectarian set of religious beliefs and did not serve a
secular purpose.110 But in Van Orden v. Perry, the Court heard a
challenge to a display of the Ten Commandments outside the Texas
state capitol, which also contained seventeen other monuments and
twenty-one historical markers.111 A divided Court held that this
latter display of the Ten Commandments was constitutional.112 The
Court’s reasoning emphasized that there was secular intent in the
display about lawgiving because the Ten Commandments were
109.
110.
111.
112.

McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
Id. at 870, 881.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 691–92.
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placed in a context intended to convey a message about history and
the law.113 The opinion seems to reflect the logic of the antitheocracy principle. It suggests that the Ten Commandments are
being used as a religiousendorsement of secular ideals in law.
The opinion, however, is overly deferential to the subjective
intent of those who created the display. Regardless of the intent in
displaying the Ten Commandments, part of the text would seem
to lack a secular equivalent to a reasonable observer. Although five
of the commandments address principles of ethical relationships,
the second five are concerned to tell citizens how to address God.
These commandments endorse the principle of monotheism and
explicitly declare polytheistic religions to be false. There seems to
be a presumptive reason to think a display of the commandments
lacks a secular equivalent or consistency with the ideal that
polytheistic believers remain equal under the law. The antitheocracy principle regards the display of the Ten Commandments
in both Van Orden and McCreary as an unconstitutional
endorsement, because the government does not explain to the
viewing public how the commandments, which declare polytheism
to be false, are consistent with the ideal that all citizens are equal
under law.
While cases like Van Orden and McCreary should be resolved by
appeal to the anti-theocracy principle, other Ten Commandment
cases implicate the equal status principle. Consider Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, which was discussed in the introduction to this
Part.114 The case considered whether the city sent a discriminatory
message when it decided to display the Ten Commandments while
rejecting a monument from another religious group, the
Summum.115 The Court sought to avoid the Establishment issue in
this case because no litigant challenged the placement of the Ten
Commandments.116 But the rejection of the monument raises the
concern that the Summum might be the subject of illegitimate state
expression. The city could be sending a message that lowers the
Summum’s status before the law. If the city rejected the monument
out of a desire to lower the status of the Summum Church, it would
113. Id.
114. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2008).
115. Id. at 464–65.
116. Id. at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“But it is also obvious that from the start, the case
has been litigated in the shadow of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause . . . .”).
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violate the anti-theocracy principle’s two prongs. If the city is
rejecting the monument because it believes the views of the
Summum are false, then the city would be sending a message that
denigrates the Summum’s religious belief, just as the Hialeah
ordinance denigrated the religious belief of the Santeria. It would
also be incompatible with the equal status requirement for the
government to send a message about the inferiority of a religious
group, even if it does so for secular reasons.
IV. GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PRAYER
Now that I have extended the anti-theocracy principle to
religious state expression, I will apply it to the Court’s decisions on
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence concerning government
sponsored prayer. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court ruled that
opening a legislative session with a sectarian prayer did not
violate the Establishment Clause.117 Town of Greece seemed to
abandon Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test for religious state
speech, replacing it with Justice Kennedy’s more permissive
coercion test.118 As Justice Kennedy wrote in his majority opinion
stating the coercion test, “[t]he town of Greece does not violate the
First Amendment by opening its meetings with prayer that
comports with our tradition and does not coerce participation
by nonadherents.”119
In my view, however, the Court did not abandon the
endorsement test. Rather, it left open the possibility of a test, like
the anti-theocracy principle and equal status principles for ruling
out the constitutionality of some government sponsored prayer.
The Court should clarify in future cases the content-based
restrictions on religious state speech. These restrictions should
require that religious state speech serve a secular purposeand avoid
animus. This approach is suggested in the following language by
the Court in Town of Greece:
If the course and practice over time shows that the invocations
denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten
damnation, or preach conversion, many present may consider
the prayer to fall short of the desire to elevate the purpose of
117. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
118. Id. at 589.
119. Id. at 591–92.

1163

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:4 (2022)

the occasion and to unite lawmakers in their common effort.
That circumstance would present a different case than the one
presently before the Court.120

This passage from Justice Kennedy points to the need for the Court
to begin to outline a content-based test of what state prayers would
be consistent with the Establishment Clause. Kennedy recognizes
that some theocratic or animus-based prayers can violate the First
Amendment. I propose the anti-theocracy principle and equal
status principles as tests for the constitutionality of sectarian
prayer, state speech, and the reasons for law.
One threshold question in Town of Greece is whether the
legislative session was engaging in state-sponsored speech or
opening a limited public forum that invited citizens to give their
private views. In accordance with the Court’s doctrine, when the
government opens a limited public forum, it is bound to accept all
viewpoints regardless of their content. I believe that the Court was
right to reject a limited public forum analysis. Such a holding
would have required that prayers meet a requirement of viewpoint
neutrality. This would have meant that all speakers would have a
right to participate regardless of the content or viewpoint of what
they said. For example, if a Ku Klux Klan minister wanted to open
a legislative session with a racist prayer, he would have to be
permitted to do so if the town’s legislative session were considered
a limited public forum open to any private view. Such a holding
would deny the town the ability to frame its own message about
the purpose of its legislative session. It would also make it more
difficult for the state to use the legislative session to endorse
constitutional values instead of theocratic, discriminatory, or
animus-based values. The Court’s finding that the state is speaking
in this instance rightly allows the town to use the legislative session
to craft its own message as it debates and passes laws.
The fact that the state is speaking, however, should not mean
that everything it wishes to say is permissible. While Justice
Kennedy suggested that theocratic or animus-based state prayers
would raise a new case different from Town of Greece,121 the Court
should stipulate clear content- and viewpoint-based limits on what
state speakers can say in the context of legislative prayer. In
120. Id. at 583.
121. Id.
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outlining these standards, the Court should apply the antitheocracy principle to its prayer decisions. It should require town
guidelines that allow sectarian prayer as long as it does not
disparage the equal status of religious or non-religious citizens.
Such an approach would recognize that protecting religious
freedom also means limiting the kind of religious reasons that
count as public reasons in state expression. Specifically, there
should be a two-pronged analysis of the constitutionality of state
sponsored prayer that reflects the requirements of the antitheocracy and equal status principles.
First, the Court should ask whether the content of a statesponsored prayer aims at a secular purpose that non-religious
citizens can share. In contrast to Justice O’Connor’s endorsement
test from Allegheny,122 the fact that the state prayer is sectarian
should not automatically rule it out. Martin Luther King’s speeches,
quoted in the government’s King Memorial, often drew on his own
religious background and sectarian references in order to endorse
the secular purpose of equal protection of the law.123 If prayers in
the spirit of King’s approach to public speech, combining religious
and secular reasoning, were offered at beginning of a legislative
session, they would be compatible with the anti-theocracy
principle. Far from making one religion the exclusive domain of the
state, they would express the compatibility of religions and a
plurality of viewpoints beyond those of co-religionists.
A second requirement of the anti-theocracy principle is
respect for the equal status of citizens, including citizens who
are non-Christian or non- religious. Some legislative prayers
clearly fail this standard. A recent prayer in the Minnesota state
legislature purported to invoke Jesus Christ as the fundamental
and exclusive authority as ruler of the United States.124 This
prayer criticized President Obama’s administration for failing to
recognize Jesus as the highest leader of the United States.125
Opening a legislative session with such a prayer fails the first

122. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 623–637
(1989), abrogated by Galloway, 572 U.S. 565.
123. K ING , supra note 65.
124. Jay Weiner, LegislativeFirestorm Erupts OverBradleeDean’s Prayer, MINN. P OST
(May 20, 2011), http://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2011/05/legislativefirestorm-erupts-over-bradlee-deans-prayer.
125. Id.
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secular independence prong of the anti-theocracy principle because
it attempts to use the government as a vehicle for solely sectarian
ends. The Minnesota state prayer also violates the equal status
prong of the anti-theocracy principle because it expresses hostility
to non-Christian citizens.
An objection to the limits on religious speech mandated by the
anti-theocracy and equal status principles might emphasize that I
am ignoring problematic secular state speech. The critic might
claim that I focus only on cases where religious state speech fails
the test of the anti-theocracy principle. I have argued, however, that
secular government speech must also avoid denigrating religious
minorities. For example, my analysis of Summum suggests that the
anti-theocracy principle is violated when a religion is denigrated,
regardless of whether the reason for denigration is secular or
religious. I also have recognized that secular state speech might
lack legitimate purpose in cases outside of religion. The display of
the Dixie flag, given its association with the slave-owning
Confederacy, is an example of secular state speech that would
violate the animus doctrine.126 These restrictions on secular state
speech show that the limits on religious state speech are not unique.
Just as some secular reasons for law can violate the equal status
principle, so too can some secular state speech.
Some might object that it would violate free speech to evaluate
different kinds of state prayer based on their content under the antitheocracy and equal status principles. I have argued, however, that
when the state speaks, it has distinct obligations under the
Constitution. Private individuals have the right of free expression
to say what they wish. But the state has additional responsibilities
since it speaks on behalf of all citizens and has the power to impose
laws. For that power to be legitimate, the state, when it speaks and
acts, must respect the equal status of all the citizens it rules. The
reasons that the state can express or enact binding laws raise a
separate set of issues from the right of free speech held by private
individuals. The anti-theocracy and equal status principles limit the
kinds of reasons that the state can express or act on as the
government. It would be unconstitutional for the state to send

126. Corey Brettschneider, Democratic Persuasion and Freedom of Speech: A Response
to Four Critics and Two Allies, 79 B ROOK . L. R EV . 1059, 1063 (2014).
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messages about the inferiority of some religions or to speak in a
way that implies the inequality of non-religious persons.
Another objection might be that by allowing some religious
government sponsored speech, including prayer, instead of
banning all of it risks crossing the boundary of “excessive
entanglement” prohibited by the third prong of Lemon.127 In
addition to Lemon’s requirement that government policies have a
secular legislative purpose, the third prong of Lemon prohibits
policies that overly involve the government in religious matters.128
But once some prayer is constitutionally allowable, as the Town of
Greece decision made clear, the question is no longer how to
separate religion from state speech. The issue is instead how to
ensure that the state does not engage in types of theocratic speech
that violate the fundamental values of the Constitution. I have
argued that can be done through an appeal to the anti-theocracy
and equal status principles.
V. THE COURTS EMBRACE OF LAW-MAKING AT ODDS WITH THE
ANTI-THEOCRACY AND EQUAL STATUS PRINCIPLES
I have offered a normative defense of the anti-theocracy and
equal status principles under the Equal Protection, Free Exercise,
and Establishment Clauses. But my argument that these two
principles offer the best account of the Constitution and my
examination of how this normative view is located in past Supreme
Court cases by no means implies a prediction about the Supreme
Court’s future path in these areas of law. Recently, the Supreme
Court has strayed from these principles. Indeed, it has charted a
collision course with them. My normative argument so far about
how the Court should interpret these three clauses is also a basis
for a critique of its most recent opinions, particularly when it comes
to issues that pit religious freedom against LGBTQ rights.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the
Court considered whether a Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s
denial of an exemption to a baker who refused to bake a cake for a

127. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 603, 624–25 (“As well as constituting an
independent evil against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect, involvement
or entanglement between government and religion serves as a warning signal.”).
128. See id. at 612–14.
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same-sex wedding violated the Free Exercise Clause.129 The Court,
relying on Lukumi, ruled that several of the statements by a
commissioner at the meeting were evidence of animus toward the
baker, rendering the Commission’s denial of the exemption
unconstitutional.130 Specifically, Justice Kennedy pointed to two
statements made by the Colorado commissioners as evidence of an
animus-based motive for the Commission’s denial of the
exemption.131 The first, Kennedy admitted, was ambiguous as to
the question of animus.132 The first commissioner said that “if a
businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue
with the—the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs
to look at being able to compromise.”133 The second, Scalia argued,
was clearly based in unconstitutional animus.134 Here the other
commissioner said,
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the
last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to
justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it
be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean,
we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion
has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the
most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use
their religion to hurt others.135

In his opinion, Kennedy said it was specifically the claim that
“one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use”
is to invoke religious beliefs to discriminate that amounted to
animus because it amounted to calling the baker’s beliefs
“despicable” and “merely rhetorical.”136 But in the ruling, Justice
Kennedy misstates and wrongly applies the doctrine he had
developed in cases like Lukumi, Romer, and Town of Greece. As I have
argued, those decisions amount to the proposition that when
religious reasons that violate the anti-theocracy or equal status
principles are used to create laws or as the basis for government
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speech, that government acts unconstitutionally when it
discriminates against or disparages gays. In other words, the
doctrine itself in these cases affirms the councilman’s contention
that some religious reasoning aimed at discrimination has no place
in public policy. Of course, the councilman calls that kind of reason
“despicable” and “merely rhetorical,”137 but understood as an
explication of the Court’s own jurisprudence, those terms can be
understood not as disparagements of religion but statements about
the inappropriateness of discriminatory religious beliefs as a basis
for lawmaking. Far from conflicting with the Court’s own idea of
“animus,” the councilman can be understood as merely stating
what the Court held in Romer and Lukumi, ruling that some
religious reasons were illegitimate bases for law.138
Like Masterpiece, the Court’s decision in Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia misstates the logic of Lukumi in a decision ruling that
Catholic Social Services (CSS) was denied its free exercise rights
when the city denied it an exemption to a non-discrimination
requirement for providing adoption service.139 The Court in Fulton
drew an analogy between the Hialeah city council’s granting of
exemptions for Muslim and Jewish slaughter but not for the
Santeria practice of animal slaughter and the city’s creation of a
system of exemptions that it refused to apply to CSS’s application
for an exemption.140
But that analogy is confused and strained. In Lukumi, the Court
criticized exemptions that were gerrymandered solely on the basis
of religion.141 In Fulton, the city was refusing to grant exemptions to
those who were discriminating against gays for religious reasons.142
Far from being at odds with the Court’s ruling in Lukumi,
Philadelphia’s policy actually reflects the Lukumi Court’s logic in
seeking to avoid religious justifications inappropriately influencing
government policy. In Lukumi, the Court rebuked those city
councilmen who refused to bracket their religious beliefs about the
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truth or falsity of the Santería religion.143 The City of Philadelphia
was trying to avoid that fate by asking CSS, as a conduit of its own
adoption policy, to bracket its religious beliefs about the suitability
of gays for parenthood when facilitating adoptions. Philadelphia’s
policy was a rightful way of seeking to avoid violating the antitheocracy and equal status principals at the core of the Court’s free
exercise doctrine—not a violation of it.
CONCLUSION
The Establishment Clause is sometimes thought to be an outlier
among constitutional protections. Whereas many constitutional
protections focus on the rights of the claimant, Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is often focused on the legitimate purposes
of the state. In particular, the Establishment Clause constitutionally
bars the state from expressing theocratic views. I have argued,
however, that the constitutional principles operating to limit
religious expression by government is no anomaly. The principles
at the core of the Establishment Clause are also fundamental to the
logic of the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses in that those
clauses limit theocratic reasoning as the basis for law as well as
religious reasons that do not comport with the equal status of
persons regardless of race, gender, or LGBTQ identity. That limit
on religious reasons is found in the animus and secular purpose
doctrines that are relevant to the Free Exercise, Equal Protection,
and Establishment Clauses.
But because of the Court’s rulings in Masterpiece and Fulton, it
appears that something quite different from those principles will
guide the Court in the future. The more the Court strays from these
principles, the more it risks affirming exactly the kind of thinking
that Madison, with Locke’s influence, crafted the First Amendment
to avoid. The risk is that, far from protecting religious freedom in
the future, the Court will begin to protect theocratic reasoning
within lawmaking. This would be a constitutional tragedy of the
highest order, undermining the philosophy behind the protections
of religious freedom at the heart of the First Amendment.
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